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The Eugenic Mind Project explores and critiques both past and present eugenic thinking.5
Informed by the perspectives of Canadian eugenics survivors in the province of Alberta6
and standpoint theory, The Eugenic Mind Project draws on both my intimate acquaintance7
with eugenics in Canada and my previous thinking about the cognitive, biological, and8
social sciences, the fragile sciences. It recounts the history of eugenics and the thinking that9
drove it, and critically engages contemporary manifestations of eugenic thought, newgenics.10
Accessible to philosophers of the biological and social sciences, historians of science and11
medicine, bioethicists, and those working on race, disability, or gender, the book aims to12
enrich ongoing discussions about human nature and human diversity, the social uses of13
biotechnology, and social policies governing future generations.14
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Projects of human improvement take both individual and intergenerational forms. The bios-21
ciences provide many technologies, including prenatal screening and the latest gene editing22
techniques, such as CRISPR, that have been viewed as providing the means to human improve-23
ment across generations. But who is fit to furnish the next generation? Historically, eugenics24
epitomizes the science-based attempt to improve human society through distinguishing kinds25
of people and then implementing social policies—from immigration restriction to sexual steril-26
ization and euthanasia—that influence and even direct what sorts of people populate our future.27
Despite recognition of the horrors of the eugenic extremes of the past and of the subhumaniz-28
ing of those sufficiently below appearance or ability norms to be viewed as “defective” or “unfit”,29
many people continue to be drawn to strands of eugenic thinking.30
The Eugenic Mind Project is a wide-ranging, philosophical book that explores and critiques31
both past and present eugenic thinking. It draws on my intimate acquaintance with eugenics32
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in North America, a familiarity generated by working closely over an extended period of time33
with survivors of eugenics in the Canadian province of Alberta. That work began shortly after I34
moved to the University of Alberta from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign in 2000.35
In teaching a few standard weeks on eugenics that focused on Nazi and American eugenics, just36
as I had in my “Biology and Society” course at Illinois, at Alberta I found myself educated37
by students who knew something about eugenics that I didn’t. They had such knowledge not38
because of some previous, special course of study but because some of their living relatives had39
been sterilized under the auspices of The Sexual Sterilization Act of Alberta, a provincial law40
in place from 1928 until 1972. While their knowledge as young adults here was not first- but41
second-hand, it soon led me to meet people even more closely connected to what I thought of42
as the eugenic past, people who had been institutionalized and sterilized putatively in accord43
with The Sexual Sterilization Act. Revelations about the university (indeed, department) that I44
had just joined as a professor of philosophy also brought eugenics closer to home.45
Over time, a small number of those who had lived through a eugenic past becamemy friends.46
Although the book occasionally draws on ideas—such as the leading idea in Chapter 8—that47
emerged from our pairwise and small group conversations and other interactions—the influence48
of these friendships on my thinking about eugenics has been more pervasive than this may49
suggest. A recent essay in Aeon, “Eugenics never went away”, that I had originally entitled “The50
feeling of eugenics”, gives perhaps the clearest sense of how my experiences while at Alberta51
have shaped the approach to eugenics taken in the book.52
The Eugenic Mind Project draws on my previous work on the cognitive, biological, and so-53
cial sciences, the fragile sciences, particularly in my Boundaries of the Mind and Genes and the54
Agents of Life. It identifies eugenics itself amongst the fragile sciences at the interface of late55
nineteenth-century ideas about the mind, biology, and sociality, recounts the history of eugen-56
ics and the thinking that drove it, explores the roots of eugenic thinking, and critically engages57
contemporary manifestations of eugenic thought, newgenics. And like much of the burgeoning58
scholarship on eugenics, it aims to provoke and enrich discussions about human nature and hu-59
man diversity, about the social uses of biotechnology, and about social policies governing future60
generations.61
Anything more than passing knowledge of the history of eugenics between 1865 and 194562
typically leads those engaged in reflection on the contemporary biosciences to raise questions63
about the potential misuse of emerging ventures in biotechnology. That reflection casts at least64
a shadow of caution over future uses of existing reproductive technologies to create so-called de-65
signer babies and to discard embryos or fetuses that do not measure up to either ideals or norms.66
Contemporary philosophers and bioethicists have sometimes seen their role in terms of escap-67
ing from that shadow in sorting the wheat from the chaff of eugenics, using their conceptual68
acumen to identify defensible forms of, or aspects to, eugenics.69
A shadow of caution certainly pervades the general scholarship on eugenics and can be found70
in the earliest and most influential work on the history of eugenics. In his preface to the second71
edition of In the Name of Eugenics, the historian Daniel Kevles cautioned that the “specter of72
eugenics hovers over virtually all contemporary developments in human genetics” (1995, ix).73
And the sociologist Troy Duster’s Backdoor to Eugenics likewise presciently warned of eugenic74
futures being created by the backdoor of individual choice. For both Kevles and Duster, the75
dangers of dormant eugenic ideas remain nascent in present and emerging biotechnologies. The76
message here has been clear: understand past eugenics, critique present eugenics, avoid future77
eugenics.78
Despite that message, there remains a feeling of distance between ourselves and the eugenic79
past to which, I believe, our collective scholarship has inadvertently contributed. In my view,80
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this is in part because that scholarship has developed largely without attention to the perspective81
of eugenics survivors themselves. By adopting what I call a standpoint eugenics—eugenics from82
the standpoint of those who have survived and those who continue to survive eugenics past and83
present—The Eugenic Mind Project attempts to dispel whatever lingering feelings of distance84
from a eugenic past remain. From that standpoint, the pro-eugenic, arm’s-length bravado shown85
particularly by philosophers and bioethicists in sorting the wheat from the chaff in eugenics past,86
present, and future have a different feel to them.87
I have already signalled that, in my own case, that feeling of distance dissolved through my88
personal connections with Alberta students and survivors of eugenics for whom eugenics was89
not at arm’s length at all. But eugenics came closer to home in another way due to peculiarit-90
ies of the history of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Alberta. While there91
were a number of students in my class who had relatives who had been sterilized on eugenic92
grounds, many more were familiar with the history of eugenics in the province because in the93
immediately preceding years—roughly 1995 until 2000—over 900 cases for wrongful confine-94
ment and sterilization had been filed against the Province of Alberta, the vast majority of which95
had been eventually settled by the government of then premier Ralph Klein. These actions fol-96
lowed the successful lawsuit of a very brave and persistent woman, Leilani Muir, with whom I97
became particularly close friends. In the course of both Leilani’s case and those settled in light98
of it, the activity of Alberta’s “Eugenics Board” came under critical scrutiny, much of which was99
widely reported in popular media venues. That board was headed for most of its history—right100
through until 1965—by the founding chair of Philosophy at the University of Alberta, John101
MacEachran, who is also the university’s longest-serving Provost.102
The introductory chapter, “Standpointing Eugenics”, locates and explains my personal and103
professional interests in eugenics and expands upon these remarks. It says a little more about Al-104
berta’s eugenic past, briefly describes the five-year, federally-funded project—theLivingArchives105
on Eugenics in Western Canada project—that brought together eugenics survivors, students, re-106
searchers, and community leaders to engage around the topic of eugenics, and attempts to be107
more explicit about the impact of working directly with eugenics survivors. Identifying what I108
call institutional complicity and engaged individuality as two dimensions anchoring the ensuing109
discussion in the book, the chapter concludes by discussing recent cases of the sterilization of wo-110
men and girls with intellectual disabilities in Australia in 2012, Latina and African-American111
women in the California prison system in 2013, and low-caste women in India in 2014. The112
chapter as a whole raises questions about the relationships between eugenics past and present.113
To take one posed and discussed in some of the recent historiography (e.g., Levine and Bash-114
ford 2010; Paul 2016; Reilly 2015), casting it here in my own terms: how does eugenic thinking,115
TheEugenic Mind, continue on beyond the 80-year social movement, ending in 1945, that was116
eugenics? And to take one that is perhaps original to the book and central to the chapters in117
Part Two of it: where does The Eugenic Mind come from?118
This introductory chapter is the first of four chapters in Part One that focus on particular119
activities central to my perspective on eugenics: standpointing, characterizing, specifying, and120
subhumanizing. Drawing on Francis Galton’s early characterization of eugenics to offer a work-121
ing characterization of eugenics useful for understanding eugenic thinking more generally, the122
second chapter, “Characterizing Eugenics”, positions eugenics as an applied science and a so-123
cial movement and identifies the importance to The Eugenic Mind of the idea of sorts of people.124
The chapter discusses the place of race, ethnicity, and disability in the practices of The Eugenic125
Mind, identifying feeblemindedness or mental deficiency as a central eugenic trait. Although126
the chapter covers much ground that is well-trodden by historians of eugenics, the focus on127
the kind of thinking that permeates eugenics distinguishes the perspective that emerges. Con-128
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centrating on what I call the short history of eugenics from 1865 to 1945, the chapter also129
reaches back to interrogate the claim that eugenics also has a long past and suggests an intimate130
connection between eugenics past and present thinking.131
What were the traits that some people had that made them targets of eugenics in the past?132
We can answer this question by exploring research publications, popular culture, and marriage133
and immigration laws. But the most powerful way to determine what a eugenic trait is in-134
volves examining eugenic sexual sterilization legislation. The third chapter, “Specifying Eugenic135
Traits”, contains a synoptic view of all such legislation passed in North America in the twentieth136
century across thirty-five jurisdictions. By comparing the province of Alberta’s sexual steriliz-137
ation law and its implementation to American eugenic laws, the chapter shows the role that138
institutionalization played in the social mechanics of eugenics and underscores the centrality of139
mental health to The Eugenic Mind. It concludes by drawing out some general conclusions140
about three eugenic traits and their atypical presence in Canadian eugenics: syphilis, Hunting-141
ton’s, and epilepsy.142
Chapter 4, “Subhumanizing the Defective”, takes up themes of life worthiness and subhu-143
manization in The Eugenic Mind. The question “what sorts of people should there be?” re-144
mains live for philosophers and bioethicists who have reopened consideration of eugenics under145
headings such as “liberal eugenics” or “procreative beneficence”. Yet that consideration typically146
neglects the significance of the subhumanization of the targets of eugenics in the short history of147
eugenics. Within standpoint eugenics, subhumanization looms large in continuing discussions,148
particularly by philosophers and bioethicists, of the differential life worthiness of different sorts149
of people. Discussing the relationship between eugenics and euthanasia and the forms that sub-150
humanization took in Alberta’s eugenic past, as well as recent challenges that cognitive disability151
has posed to philosophical ethics in discussions of newgenics, the chapter illustrates standpoint152
eugenics in action. It concludes with reflection on a recent, widely discussed case involving in-153
tellectual disability, that of the child known in both the academic literature and social media as154
“Ashley X”.155
The next four chapters constitute Part Two of the book and focus on understanding the156
persistence of eugenics and what I call its social mechanics. The fifth chapter, “Where Do Ideas157
of Human Variation Come From?”, begins by returning to consider the prosociality that mo-158
tivates eugenic interventions and its relationship to views of human diversity and variation. It159
articulates a novel problem, what I call the puzzle of marked variation, and outlines four ini-160
tial desiderata that a response to the puzzle should meet. The puzzle of marked variation is161
quite general and can be raised with respect to many ways of sorting people, but this chapter162
focuses on its application to categories of disablement and their relationship to sub-normalcy.163
The chapter argues that the appeal to biopolitics and the socially constructed nature of disability164
offered by those drawing on the work on Michel Foucault—such as Lennard Davis, Nikolas165
Rose, and Shelley Tremain—are more limited than is suggested by their popularity in explor-166
ations of the relationship between disability and eugenics. The chapter concludes by drawing167
on a variant of the open question argument against naturalism in ethics that traces back to the168
philosopher G. E. Moore to extend the list of desiderata for responses to the puzzle of marked169
variation.170
The desiderata introduced in Chapter 5 not only help to identify problems with the ap-171
peal to biopolitics in discussions of eugenics and disability but also suggest that the puzzle of172
marked variation has both psychological and social dimensions. Beginning with a point about173
human vulnerability that can be traced to the work of the political philosopherThomas Hobbes174
and drawing on my past and ongoing work on situated cognition and collective intentionality,175
Chapter 6, “A Socio-Cognitive Framework for the Puzzle of Marked Variation”, introduces176
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a general framework for addressing the puzzle of marked variation that straddles the fragile177
sciences of cognition and sociality. It discusses what is distinctive about human sociality and178
prosociality and identifies the cognitive demands that each makes. As a species, we have de-179
veloped distinctive forms of cognition that are situated, extended, and collective and which are180
integral to our prosociality. The resulting cognitively-mediated normativity we possess allows181
us to distinguish between sorts of people. That, in turn, creates the possibility of treating those182
who are perceived or thought of as being like us—as being of our kind—differently than we treat183
others. In postulating a “like us” detector and clarifying the idea of first-person, plural mechan-184
isms, the chapter specifies the nature of some of the socio-cognitive mechanisms hypothesized185
as being operant in The Eugenic Mind.186
Chapter 7, “Backdoors, Newgenics, and Eugenics Underground”, returns to consider in187
more detail appeals to newgenics, the so-called backdoor to eugenics, and issues arising at the188
interface of contemporary bioethics and disability. Working with the disability theorist Rose-189
marie Garland-Thomson’s idea of a eugenic logic, the chapter recasts the debate over the disab-190
ility rights critique of prenatal screening with selective abortion and identifies newgenic strains191
in contemporary bioethical thinking about procreation. My aim with respect to the first of these192
has been to keep the focus squarely on selective abortion and disability without entering larger193
debates over, or the history of, reproductive rights and abortion (cf. Dyck 2013, chap. 7–8).194
The discussion of selective abortion and disability here shares with the original disability rights195
critiques offered by Adrienne Asch and Marsha Saxton the assumption that abortion is in gen-196
eral permissible. Yet like those critiques, my discussion also shares the permanent possibility197
of being appropriated by “pro-life” factions in debates over abortion, possibilities heightened198
in present US politics. The application of the principle of procreative beneficence, articulated199
and defended by the philosopher Julian Savulescu to argue that reproduction should be free of200
disability, is rejected and the general character of eugenics under neoliberalism identified and201
critically discussed. The chapter, which draws in part on joint work with Matthew Barker and202
Joshua St. Pierre, concludes with a discussion of eugenic silencing by focusing on autism and203
self-advocacy.204
The eighth chapter, “Eugenics as Wrongful Accusation”, completes the exploration of the205
persistence of eugenics by introducing another dimension to the social mechanics of eugenics.206
It begins with a question about eugenics after 1945: how is it that eugenic practices, such as207
sterilization, didn’t simply disappear or cease? In offering an answer to this question, the chapter208
further develops the socio-cognitive framework, working very much across the borders that are209
usually drawn between the social and the psychological and further documenting the corres-210
ponding continuities between eugenics past and newgenics present. The subject matter here is211
not the origins of our ideas of human variation, as in Chapters 5 and 6, nor their manifestation212
in contemporary newgenics and the continuity between eugenics and newgenics, as in Chapter213
7; rather, it is the persistence of old-fashioned eugenics itself.214
The novel perspective that the chapter introduces is to view eugenics as wrongful accusa-215
tion, a phenomenon best understood through a paradigm example: the ritual sexual abuse cases216
predominant in the 1980s and 1990s. The explanatory value of this assimilation of eugenics to217
such cases lies in what it reveals about the psycho-social dynamics of eugenics. Here the chapter218
draws on the work of Judith Herman on trauma and witnessing, though it takes those ideas in a219
direction that Herman herself (and those whom she has influenced in thinking about witnessing220
and sex crimes) would likely resist.221
Having introduced the idea of standpoint eugenics early in Chapter 1, the book has pro-222
ceeded by approaching The Eugenic Mind from the perspectives of eugenics survivors. In the223
final two chapters, which make up Part Three, the discussion returns to reflect more explicitly224
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on the nature of standpoint eugenics itself. Chapter 9, “Knowing Agency”, develops the idea of225
what I call knowing agency at the margins by drawing on standpoint theory in epistemology, with226
particular attention given to the standing and credibility of cognitive disability in philosophy.227
There is a kind of unacknowledged epistemic apartheid in approaches to the general idea that228
knowledge is contextual that itself shapes how marginal knowers are viewed in the discipline of229
philosophy. The politics of epistemic apartheid—between feminism and analytic epistemology,230
for example—forms part of the context in which the possibilities for standpoint eugenics can231
be envisaged and assessed. What it’s like to occupy the marginalized standpoint of cognitive232
disability is conveyed through a discussion of the work and perspective of Eva Kittay.233
The final chapter, “Standpoint Eugenics Unbound: Survivorship for the Subhuman”, artic-234
ulates and takes up some of the internal complexities to applying standpoint theory to eugenics235
and disability. Standpoint theory applies paradigmatically to class and gender, and has been236
deployed with respect to other examples, such as race and sexuality within feminist standpoint237
theory. The generalization of standpoint theory to disability, particularly intellectual disability,238
faces distinctive problems that derive from the focus of standpoint theory on class and gender239
and the kind of view of the dynamics of knowing agency from the margins that holds in these240
cases. Here I make use of the ideas of joint action and extended action familiar from the cognit-241
ive sciences, and, taking my cue from work in the philosophy of biology, raise questions about242
the significance for standpoint eugenics of the intrinsic heterogeneity of categories of disable-243
ment. Whether there are the sorts of people posited in The Eugenic Mind is an issue that also244
affects the prospects for a robust standpoint eugenics. Perhaps we will need to be satisfied, after245
all, with a standpoint-ish eugenics, a perspective on eugenics that takes seriously themotivations246
for and orientation of standpoint theory but which stops short of applying an adapted form of247
standpoint theory to eugenics and disability.248
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